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The Development of Collective 
Bargaining in the Toronto Printing 
Industry in the Nineteeth Century 
Sally Zerker 
Analysts of collective bargaining hâve tended to stress 
prédominant functional characteristics, in gênerai classed as 
marketing, governmental, and managerial théories. Less em-
phasis has been placed on the importance of power relation-
ships between organizations. A careful review of the develop-
ment of collective bargaining in the Toronto printing industry 
in the nineteenth century suggests that the latter is the most 
significant factor in the historical process. 
THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Modem analysts of the institution of collective bargaining hâve put 
forward a variety of théories, each of which posits some careful définition 
of the fundamental nature of this widespread social practice. In gênerai, 
the stress has been upon what the theorist considers to be the prédominant 
function of the collective bargaining process. Neil Chamberlain, in his 
comprehensive study Collective Bargaining,1 proposed that the diverse 
theoretical formulations can be grouped into three encompassing caté-
gories. « Thèse are that collective bargaining is ( 1 ) a means of con-
tracting for the sale of labour, (2) a form of industrial government, and 
(3) a method of management. » 2 He suggested too, that to some extent 
thèse three theoretical approaches, respectively called marketing, govern-
mental and managerial, reflect the historical process in the évolution of 
collective bargaining. Thus in the 
beginning, mainly the problems of 
wage rates and hours of work 
dominated labour-management rela-
i Neil W. CHAMBERLAIN, Collective Bargaining, New York, McGraw-
Hill, 1951. 
2 Ibid., p. 121. 
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tions, and therefore analysts emphasized the marketing theory. Subséquent 
developments brought to bear the question of between-contract arbitration, 
which in turn led to the governmental view. Yet a third stage introduced 
the managerial aspect when unions interjected labour's right to participate 
in a broad range of vital managerial décisions. 
However, while recognizing that thèse différent treatments ail hâve 
merit in the present-day state of the institution, it remains largely spécula-
tive whether or not the development of collective bargaining pursued this 
historical course. Without deliberate empirical investigation of early 
union-management relations that graduated to collective bargaining, we 
are faced with the condition of inadéquate test of the evolutionary pro-
cess. Moreover, important insights into the nature of collective bargaining 
may be neglected, and to the degree that genetic characteristics influence 
the mature structure, the analysis may require intégration of fresh 
perspectives gained from empirical studies. 
A CASE STUDY — THE TORONTO TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 
It is obvious then that case studies of nmeteenth-century union 
expériences should prove useful for scholarship in this field. For Canadian 
unions it is rare to find extant documents that span the course of the 
relevant period. At least one Canadian union with such records is the 
Toronto Typographical Union, whose carefully preserved minute books 
supplemented by International Typographical Union convention pro-
ceedings and some significant miscellaneous documents, provide the 
required source material for a case study of collective bargaining deve-
lopments in the Toronto printing industry. 
The Toronto Typographical Union is a familiar body in the accounts 
of Canadian labour history, understandably so since it has the distinction 
of the longest continuous history among Canadian labour organizations, 
and because the records of Canadian federated union developments are 
replète with évidence of its contributing rôle. The TTU was first estab-
lished in what was then still the town of York on the twelfth of October, 
1832.3 Except for a break of seven years, from 1837 to 1844, 4 when the 
organization folded and was dormant, the TTU has performed as the 
3 John ARMSTRONG, «Sketch of the Early History of No. 91.» Convention 
Souvenir, 1905 (Archives, Toronto Typographical Union) . 
4 ZERKER, A History of the Toronto Typographical Union, 1832-1925 (Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Toronto, 1972), pp. 47-8. 
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représentative of printers in Toronto to the présent day. Since the major 
innovations in bargaining practices were formulated through the years 
of the nineteenth century, this will be the focus of our interest. A sig-
nificant factor during this period was the growth of the power and au-
thority of the International Typographical Union, a parent organization 
of printing craft unions which was founded in the United States in 1850 
and spread into Canada in the 1860's. The Toronto union became an 
affiliate of the ITU in 1866,5 and as such was to expérience the impact 
of ITU policy changes along with its sister unions on the North American 
continent. 
The union's early records might be taken to suggest that Chamber-
lain's marketing theory could be applied to the initial stage of the To-
ronto Typographical Union's opération. There is no question that the 
union's primary objective from the beginning was labour's participation 
in the détermination of working conditions, in particular a voice in the 
establishment of wage rates and hours of work. However, one cannot 
describe early union-management relations in any sensé as « bargaining » 
procédure. An élaboration of the actual techniques is warranted at this 
juncture. 
In order to explain the early forms of wage détermination one must 
examine the position of the labourer in the context of the historical devel-
opment of property rights in western capitalist society. John Porter quite 
rightly pointed out that in Canada, as elsewhere where capitalism pre-
vailed, the right of workers to organize and to strike was not a traditional 
privilège, but was won after considérable struggle, as a concession from 
the ruling élite. 6 The labourer who lacked property rights in the pro-
ductive instruments also thereby lacked any control over his conditions 
of employment. His only recourse was the withdrawal of his services. 
But individual, unorganized withdrawal of services could hâve little or 
no effect on the productive process, so long as replacements were avail-
able. Therefore, withdrawal of services as a coercive force became a mat-
ter of combined and coordinated measures. 
It was the development and growth of unions as the instrument of 
combined action that made striking, or the threat of striking, a feasible, 
effective weapon in the détermination of employment conditions. Union 
5 Ibid., p 125. 
6
 John PORTE/?, The Vertical Mosaic, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1965, p. 311. 
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procédure inevitably depended on coercive techniques since capitalist 
society excluded those without property rights from decision-making 
power. On the other hand, the owners of capital goods were accorded 
absolute power in employment of their private property. Coercive élé-
ments, of course, inhered in that power. Both sides then operated in a 
climate of opposition with the prospect of forceful means as the sole ingré-
dient for seulement of différences. At any given time, the ultimate déter-
mination of employment conditions became a matter of the relative power 
positions of the two opposing factions. This was unavoidable so long 
as the concession to labour and to the union as the collective will of 
labour was not firmly established. 
WAGE DETERMINATION BY UNILATERALLY IMPOSED CONDITIONS 
One can observe this phenomenon in the Toronto printing industry. 
For the better part of the nineteenth century, indeed until the late 1880's, 
wage détermination was the product of unilaterally imposed conditions. It 
is fair to say that in the early years neither union nor management pro-
positions were in any sensé bargaining proposais. They were meant to 
be met in full by the other party, or rejected in full with the conséquence 
of industrial conflict. 
Among the factors that influenced the relative power positions of 
union and management, probably the two most important were (1) 
économie conditions in gênerai and industrial conditions in particular, 
and (2) the degree of union control of the labour supply. When prices 
were rising and demand for printer labour was high, there was both 
incentive and prospect for union success in a bid for higher wages. In 
addition, the proportion of union membership relative to total labour 
supply was a significant considération for both union and management. 
The TTU minutes of 1850 record an exercise by the union that was 
meant to assess thèse criteria before the members were prepared to make 
demands for higher wages. A committee of eight members was appointed 
to investigate the following conditions current in the printing trade : « (1) 
the number of men employed in each office in the city ; (2) the number 
of union men in each office ; (3) compliance with union régulation wher-
ever an office is composed of a majority of union men ; (4) the number 
of apprentices in each shop. » 7 One présumes that the results of the 
7
 Minutes of the Toronto Typographical Union (Archives, Toronto Typo-
graphical Union), August 5, 1850, p. 217. 
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survey were encouraging,8 for the union followed up this review of union 
strength with a demand for higher wages. In addition, the Toronto print-
ing industry was currently experiencing buoyant demand.9 
One observes that union procédure for effecting the wage raise 
followed the practice of one-sided action. After membership agreement 
to the new scale, the union ordered a printed copy of the various 
rates for distribution to the master printers in September, 1850.10 
No allowance was made for consultation and bargaining. In that instance 
the employers accepted the increase without conflict. Given the current 
économie and union conditions, the employers in 1850 were in no position 
to reject the raise. However, with rising demand it was probably the case 
that it was also unnecessary for them to resist. 
Employers, even more than union leaders, insisted on their right 
to dictate terms of employment. A seeming disadvantage for employers 
in the early years was their inability or unwillingness to form an employer 
coalition. 
George Brown had attempted to lead the Toronto employers into 
an association in 1844 with the object of enforcing an industry-wide wage 
réduction, but the organization could not be cemented. n Again, an effort 
was made in 1847 to bring Toronto's printing employers into line and 
produce a stronger position for masters, but also without success.12 In 
the first instance, Toronto employers were apparently unimpressed with 
Brown's argument for wage parity with Kingston. The market for local 
newspapers was then protected by distance and individuality. The second 
endeavour failed when a coalition of employers clumsily misrepresented 
their objectives to the union. They had implied that a joint union-manage-
ment committee could fruitfully pursue the prospect of a wage increase. 
Instead, as reported to the members, « when the committee of the em-
ployers made known their proposai to the Delegates, it appeared that the 
8
 The union records do not include the final tally. 
9
 Minutes, January 5, 1850, p. 176 and p. 183. Four new news shops, in-
cluding the office of the Queen's Printer had begun opérations in the closing months 
of 1849 in Toronto. 
10 Minutes, September 1850, p. 220. 
H Minutes, April 2, 1845, and Zerker, pp. 49-53, for élaboration of the back-
ground to this failure. 
12 Minutes, March 31, 1847, p. 83. 
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élévation spoken of, amounted to nothing less than a réduction of the 
présent rate of wages. » 13 The déception produced the counter-effect of 
increasing union membership 14 and thus strengthening the power of the 
organization. Indeed, the effect of both ventures was that of broadening 
the attractiveness of unionization for local printers. 
Without formai agreement among employers it was difficult, but not 
impossible, to impose an industry-wide decrease in wages ; the critical 
factor was the state of industrial compétition. There were prominent 
employers, like Brown and John Ross Robertson, who rejected the rep-
résentative rôle of the union and who were able to staff their shops at 
wages below union scale. One finds accusations in the union records 
that such establishments received poorer quality workmen. Be that as it 
may, the existence of such non-union, low-wage shops was extremely 
hazardous for union members' security during periods of heightened 
compétition. Their effect was to drag down the gênerai wage level to 
the lower rate; one such expérience is found to hâve occurred in 1859 
for workers in the daily newspaper s. Neither the Colonist nor the Leader 
were able to compete in a tight market with the non-union scale of 28^ 
per 1000 ems paid at the Globe in 1859, when union rates were 33 1/30 
per 1000 ems. The union was forced to accept a wage réduction for both 
unionized newspaper shops.15 Thus even without formai agreement 
the résistant employers could influence overall employment conditions 
to the détriment of the union's terms. 
MORE COOPERATIVE METHODS AND ITS RETARDATION 
From the union's point of view the imposed method of wage dé-
termination was far from satisfactory, even when it was the union which 
dictated the terms. In the first place, union gains through unilatéral 
imposition could last only as long as the employers' period of relative 
weakness. Secondly, with the absence of consultation, the union had no 
real security with respect to continued goodwill of even those employers 
who tolerated unionized workmen. More coopérative methods were clearly 
in the interest of the union, and we find beginning in that direction in 
the latter part of the 1860's and early 1870's. This is particularly évident 
in non-monetary matters. Through union-management consultation, the 
13 Minutes, February 2, 1848, p. 93. 
14 ZERKER, p. 64. 
15 Minutes, Spécial Meeting, May 10, 1859, and June, 1859. 
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issue of unprejudiced distribution of advertisement copy (matter which 
was faster to set and therefore more lucrative for the typesetter) was 
satisfactorily settled.16 The recurring problem of apprenticeship ratios 
also was ironed out by means of negotiations with employers.17 
If during this period there are signs of coopérative developments 
however, the movement in that direction was halted by 1872. The cause 
of the check was the famous Toronto printers' strike for shorter hours, 
which began on March 25, 1872.18 The union claimed that prior to the 
breakdown of production, « on three occasions the printers asked for a 
conférence with the employers in an effort to avoid difficulties »,19 but 
that their invitations were rejected. The demand for shorter hours was 
regarded by the employers as an outrageous invasion of their rightful au-
thority and hence it was seen as a non-negotiable issue. With this added 
inducement and under the guidance of George Brown, ail but one20 
Toronto printing employer formed an alliance, the Master Printers' Asso-
ciation, specifically designed to fight this fresh threat to their position 
and power. 21 The net effect of the strike for shorter hours on union-
management relations, a strike that was bitter and protracted, was to 
harden the antagonism between the opposing factions and to open old 
sores which required years of healing. 22 
The progress towards coopération was further retarded by the winds 
of dépression which hit the Canadian economy with full fury through the 
years 1876 to 1879. 23 Towards the latter part of 1875 the effect of the 
world-wide dépression became noticeable in the printing industry in Toron-
to. The first indication of a cost squeeze on publishers was a « request » to 
16
 Minutes, November 2, 1871, called «fat» copy in the vernacular of the 
trade. 
17
 Minutes, Spécial Meeting, April, 1871. 
18 ZERKER, pp. 420-40, for full account of the strike. 
19 Ontario Workmen, June 13, 1872, p. 4. 
20 James BEATY, M. P., owner and publisher of the Leader. 
21 Telegraph, March 23, 1872. 
22 The outcome of the strike was in part favourable to the union. The union 
gained its objective of a 54-hour working week ; however, the gain was made at 
a cost of considérable initial loss of union strength. Membership fell from 190 
in 1871 to 90 in 1872. 
23 E. J. CHAMBERS, «Late Nineteenth Century Business Cycles in Ca-
nada, » Canadian Journal of Economies and Political Science, Vol. 30, 1964, p. 
395. 
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the union from the Mail office management for a 5 % wage eut. 24 The 
« request » of 1875 was later transformed into an ultimatum. The union 
was told to accept a 10% wage réduction or ail men employed at the 
Mail office would be fired and replaced by « less compétent workmen. » 25 
This was merely the beginning of a period of downward spiralling wages 
and rising unemployment that lasted the remainder of the décade. It was 
clear that during this severe dépression the union was impotent and strike 
action was out of the question. 
The TTU was not in a more favourable and forceful position vis-à-
vis the employers until the mid-80's.26 A review of cyclical behaviour 
indicates positive signs of économie recovery at the turn of the décade. 
However, for the printers, the net resuit of a décade of union décline, 
due to a combination of industrial strife and dépression, was that the TTU 
virtually lost control of many printing establishments in the city.27 Alter-
native techniques to the strike weapon were tried. A secret committee 
was forged to work surreptitiously to reorganize men and shops.2S Fur-
thermore, a boycott of the Telegram and the Mail was called by the 
union in an effort to coerce publishers through threats of reduced cir-
culation. Neither of thèse measures, however, produced any positive 
results.29 Fortunately for the TTU timely developments in the Inter-
national organization were to hâve salutory conséquences. 
THE EFFECT OF ITU POLICY CHANGES 
In the mid-80's, ITU subordinates entered a new phase under the 
influence of policy measures adopted by the parent organization. Nothing 
altered the nature of collective bargaining in the Toronto printing industry 
so much as the growing trend towards centralization of power in the 
ITU. Within this process, the most radical institutional change was the 
24 Minutes, October 30, 1875, p. 50. 
25 Minutes, November 4, 1876, p. 179. 
26
 Minutes, March 17, 1883, p. 503. At this late date, even though the union 
presented évidence of rising wages in other skilled trades, the TTU was unsuccess-
ful in an attempt at imposing their own wage increase. 
27 ZERKER, pp. 189-90. 
28 Minutes, October 4, 1879, p. 273 ; December 4, 1880, p. 336 ; January, 
1881, p. 350. 
29 ZERKER, pp. 190-3. 
T H E DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE T O R O N T O . . . 91 
establishment of an International strike défense fund in 1885.30 The 
significance of the ITU fund law for the local was that, on the one hand, 
local financing of strikes was necessarily abandoned, while on the other 
hand, strike relief for the subordinate union was only applicable with 
sanction in advance by the International Executive Council. 31 In effect 
this meant that the Toronto local required the approval of the ITU prés-
ident, its chief organizer, and a vice-président or state deputy, before 
calling for a new scale of wages. By 1888, the work of supervising local 
bargaining was entrusted to seven district organizers, who were elected 
by the delegates to the ITU conventions.32 
The décade of the 1880's also saw a second and related develop-
ment that had an impact on bargaining procédures. The commercial 
printing employers 33 formed an international organization in 1887 called 
the United Typothetae of America.34 Significantly, delegates to the 
first convention urged the abandonment of old methods of settling issues 
and proposed instead that wages should be fixed by conférence between 
ail employers and ail employées in the city where disputes arose.35 The 
first président of the UTA, Théodore L. DeVinne, acknowledged that 
30 Proceedings of the International Typographical Union Conventions, 1885, 
p. 157. Strikes, sec. 1-10. For a full account of historical development of strike 
fund law, see Zerker, pp. 302-6. 
31 George E. BARNETT, The Printers, American Economie Association Quar-
terly, Third Séries, Vol. X, October, 1909, p. 328. 
32 Proceedings, 1888, p. 146 ; also BARNETT, The Printers, p. 329. The whole 
of Canada was designated as one of the seven districts. 
33 The trade had by then become separated into commercial and newspaper 
sectors, with distinct wage and hourly terms for each sector. In the newspaper 
sector, negotiations with the News management over rates for working the new 
typesetting machines produced what may be the first written labour contract in 
Canada, in December, 1892 (Minutes, January 7, 1893, p. 286) . One month 
before, John Ross Robertson's Telegram was unionized (Minutes, November 19, 
1892, p. 262) after a décade of conflict, bringing every morning and evening 
newspaper in Toronto under TTU jurisdiction for the first time in its history. 
Subsequently, the TTU bargained with ail the newspapers together, and after 1902 
the ITU and the American Newspaper Publishers' Association set up an arbitration 
agreement to settle différences that arose under contract between an Association 
member and an ITU local. In 1907 Toronto referred a dispute to the National 
Board of Arbitration, set up under the above agreement (Minutes, December 5, 
1908, p. 102, for report of the Board). 
34 Elizabeth F . BAKER, Printers and Technology, New York, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1957, pp. 242-5. 
35 Ibid., p. 245, citing UTA Proceedings, 1887, pp. 30-1. 
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the rôle of the new society was to formalize the two-sided aspect of bar-
gaining procédures. « For many years, » he complained, « we hâve ne-
glected our plainest duty . . . The rules and rates that hâve prevailed 
hâve been made almost exclusively by the compositors of our offices . . . 
We hâve seldom been asked to confer with thèse compositors as to the 
feasibility of proposed rates and rules. » 36 The need to counter the grow-
ing power of the International Typographie al Union was apparent in the 
commercial employers' détermination to unité. Seemingly, interest in 
bilatéral bargaining by employers arose only after International central-
ization of power came to dominate the policy of the organization.37 
Thus, from the late 1880's local bargaining procédures were subse-
quently determined to a lesser or greater degree by policy décisions made 
by supervisory, or in the case of employers, advisory bodies, which were 
not directly involved in the local issues at stake. Futhermore, on both 
sides of the bargaining table the emphasis was on the avoidance of out-
right industrial warfare. The conservatism of the ITU with respect to 
strike implementation dates back to the formative years of the organi-
zation, 38 and after 1885 the machinery for avoiding strikes was instituted 
under the authority of the strike fund law. With funds in the control 
of the ITU it became a matter of interest for the well-being of the whole 
continental printer community to préserve the revenue to the best of its 
ability, and therefore, wherever possible to settle issues amicably. On 
the part of the United Typothetae, coopération and consultation was 
as well a matter of officiai policy.39 
BILATERAL BARGAINING IN THE TORONTO PRINTING INDUSTRY 
The stage was set now in Toronto for new approaches to the dé-
termination of employment conditions. Towards the end of 1890 we hâve 
36 ibid., p. 246, citing UT A Proceedings, 1888, pp. 22-23. 
37
 Ibid., pp. 242-244, see discussion of the rise of the United Typothetae of 
America and the inducement of centralization of power in the ITU in its formation. 
38
 In part the conservatism of the ITU was related to fear of reprisai from 
employers. Typical of printer organizations' attitudes towards capital was the 
Toronto Typographical Union's slogan, « united to support — not combined to 
injure.» {Minutes, vol. 1845-51, Flyleaf.) 
39
 In Toronto, by 1890 there was a Commercial Employers' Association 
operating in Toronto. TTU minutes for the years 1884-89 hâve been lost ; there-
fore it is uncertain at what point exactly the commercial printers of Toronto 
formed their association. 
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documentary évidence of the first instance of bilatéral bargaining taking 
place in the commercial branch of the trade. Procédures to arrive at a 
new se aie began in the usual way of a draft présentation by the TTU 
business committee to the membership. After membership discussion and 
approval of the draft, the union then proceeded to présent the « pro-
posed » scale to the employers. No longer was the union décision on the 
scale of wages a prélude to ultimatum. Rather, it now represented a first 
step in employer-employée bargaining. 
One of the costs of developing new, more coopérative techniques for 
wage détermination was that seulement was achieved only through an 
enormously lengthy process of consultation. A résume of the protracted 
negotiations relative to the commercial sector was presented to the mem-
bers fully nine months after the first proposai. The report to the members 
was as follows : 
We met in Shaftesbury Hall, Dec. 23, 1890, drew up a circular 
to Employers which was sent, together with proposed Scale of Priées. 
On Jan. lOth '91, we met to receive replies from Employers and Em-
ploying Printers Association to the circular sent them. A sub-com-
mittee was appointed to meet the Association Committee, consisting 
of Messrs. Coultier, (Jas) Jeffers, Prescott and Temms. Sub-committee 
met the Association in Rosin House Jan. 18th when the time-work 
Sections were discussed. Conférence adjourned till Jan. 19th when 
Sec. 1 to 11 of Weekly Newspaper Scale were defined and subjected 
to debate. Conférence adjourned till Jan. 26th and was further post-
poned till Jan. 28th at request of the Association when we completed 
the debate on remaining Sections. The Association Committee was 
then prepared to lay their work before their respective body for 
action. *° 
With it ail, the meeting conférences, and delays, total agreement had still 
to be finalized. 
On March 28, 1891, a second proposai was presented to the mem-
bership. 41 The form of this document is of particular interest to the 
researcher of bargaining developments. Incorporated in the présentation 
is the complète range of alternatives open to the members. For each of 
thirty-nine separate sections, each dealing with spécifie wage rates for 
40 Minutes, September 5, 1891, p. 112. 
41 Minutes, March 28, 1891, p. 57. 
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varied working conditions, there was included a record of the union's 
original motion as of December 1890, the Employing Printers Asso-
ciation^ counter proposai, and the union negotiating committee's current 
recommendations. 
When one examines the document carefully, one notes that prior to 
présentation to the membership, nineteen proposais had been worked 
out satisfactorily between union and employer représentatives. Thèse 
were in turn approved by the members présent at the meeting of March 
28. On nine other points at issue, the men agreed with the negotiating 
committee's recommendation, which was to insist on the original proposai. 
Significantly, thèse included some of the most important monetary con-
ditions, that is a $12.00 weekly time work rate, an overtime rate for time 
workers, overtime rates for pièce work, and so on. Finally on three 
points, the union voted to compromise between the employers' and their 
own respective positions, and on eight other sections the union acceded 
to the EPA's demands. 
Six months later yet a third document was submitted to the mem-
bers, revealing seven remaining areas in dispute. The employers were 
still holding out for an $11.00 weekly rate and for lower pièce work 
rates for some spécifie composing matter, as well as the right to déter-
mine the hourly distribution of the 54-hour week on an individual basis. 
At this point the union agreed to accept two of the employers' demands, 
both of which related to pièce work overtime rates and compensation 
for redistribution of type. The lïve remaining areas of dispute were non-
negotiable since both sides regarded their own proposais as essential 
conditions for seulement. A vote was then taken on the whole wage 
package according to the terms the union had accepted. When the neces-
sary three-quarters majority accepted the scale,42 the ITU was informed 
of the results of the vote so that the union could receive International 
sanction, should a strike become necessary.43 
The ultimate resolution of this case was not determined by the 
votes of the local membership, but by the unwillingness of the Interna-
42
 By ITU law, a three-quarters majority vote was necessary in order to call 
a strike. Proceedings, 1876, p. 65. 
43 Minutes, September 19, 1891, p. 132. 
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tional Executive to sanction a strike call. M However, the agreement was 
made and the terms were accepted by the Toronto membership. Local 
industrial relations were indeed made less volatile but at some cost to 
local autonomy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For our purposes, the developments described hère are significant 
for a number of reasons. First, both union and management left behind 
them the method of one-sided imposition of employment conditions. It 
is true that an impasse between the parties could still resuit in an out-
break of industrial strife. But machinery was made operative to keep 
the potential for such disruption of the production process at a minimum. 
Secondly, in considering what crucial factor contributed to the 
institutionalization of bilatéral collective bargaining, we are impressed 
with the importance of the augmented power of the International, through 
centralization and the fund law. In effect the fund law was an instrument 
of continental power that was transférable to the local when the need 
arose. The necessity to rely on relative and temporary power superiority 
disintegrated because the ITU, with the weight of numbers and funds 
behind it, represented a stable, powerful force that could not be ignored. 
The clout of the parent organization, real or potential, had the effect of 
shifting relative power positions to labour's advantage. Accordingly, 
employers were persuaded to accept the présence of labour as a per-
manent participant in decision-making, and it became necessary to devise 
alternatives to the old coercive methods. 
One can argue further that the development of bilatéral collective 
bargaining was in itself évidence that the concession to labour had been 
won and not granted as a right. Moreover, it had been won within the 
framework of capitalist society only when labour's power was demon-
strably clear. It was this that produced the climate of willing coopération 
necessary for bargaining. 
44
 This was the first time the parent body subjugated the needs of the Toronto 
local to demands of International policy. What was at issue at this crucial hour 
was a battle for a 9-hour day in Pittsburgh, and the ITU was fighting it as a 
test case for the continent. The Toronto union's success of 1872 was not typical 
of the rest of the printing community. See Zerker, Chapter VI, Loss of Local Au-
tonomy, for a discussion of the damaging effects of centralized ITU power on the 
Toronto Typographical Union. 
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Finally, any analysis of collective bargaining should take note of 
Allan Flander's view that collective bargaining is also « a power relation-
ship between organizations. » 45 On the basis of the case study presented 
hère, one sees the origins of collective bargaining as a product of such 
organizational power relationships. That working conditions were the 
prime concern of bilatéral bargaining in the early years, in accordance 
with marketing théories, is of course quite right. Moreover, govern-
mental and managerial functions were definitely introduced later into 
collective bargaining activities. However, it is suggested from this study 
that an understanding of collective bargaining, either historically or cur-
rently, requires a reassessment of the rôle of power relationships between 
organizations. 
La négociation collective dans l'industrie torontoise 
de l'imprimerie au 19e siècle 
Les analystes modernes de cette institution qu'est devenue la négociation 
collective ont mis de l'avant beaucoup de théories, chacune d'entre elles énonçant 
une définition appliquée de la nature fondamentale de cette pratique sociale tant 
répandue. En général, on a surtout insisté sur ce que le théoricien considère être 
la fonction prédominante du processus de négociation collective. On peut le con-
sidérer sous trois aspects : marchandage, politique, gestion. On a aussi fait valoir 
que cette triple façon théorique de considérer le processus de négociation collec-
tive rend bien compte de son évolution historique. 
Toutefois, pour scruter à la fois son fondement théorique et sa valeur histo-
rique, il est nécessaire d'en contrôler les résultats par une investigation empirique 
systématique. Le Syndicat des typographes de Toronto s'est prêté à cette analyse 
parce qu'il est le plus ancien au Canada et qu'il a conservé ses archives pour la 
période du XIXe siècle pendant laquelle les principales innovations en matière 
de négociation collective furent formulées. 
Les premières formes de détermination des salaires dans l'industrie de l'im-
primerie à Toronto furent caractérisées par l'imposition unilatérale des conditions 
de travail. Elles se fondaient sur les positions de force relative du syndicat et des 
employeurs lesquelles en retour dépendaient beaucoup des conditions économiques 
générales et du degré de contrôle du syndicat sur la main-d'oeuvre. Il est évident 
que le syndicat considérait insatisfaisante cette façon de fixer les salaires. Alors 
que la recherche de méthodes plus positives était en voie de réalisation, la fa-
meuse grève des imprimeurs de Toronto en 1872 eut pour conséquence de laisser 
béant un large fossé entre les employeurs et le Syndicat des typographes de To-
45 Allan FLANDERS (éd.), Collective Bargaining, Middlesex, England, Pen-
guin Books, 1969, «The Nature of Collective Bargaining,» pp. 11-41. 
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ronto. En outre, la dépression de la fin de la décennie 1870 nuisit au projet de 
rétablissement de relations normales entre les parties. 
Un nouvel événement se produisit en 1885 qui devait subséquemment amorcer 
la négociation collective bilatérale dans l'industrie de l'imprimerie à Toronto. 
L'Union typographique internationale dont le syndicat de Toronto était devenu 
une section affiliée, institua un fonds de défense professionnelle international. Le 
fonds servit de courroie de transmission de la force continentale à la section de-
venue dépendante lorsque des conflits survenaient. Les premières négociations col-
lectives bilatérales eurent lieu dans l'industrie de l'imprimerie torontoise en 1890. 
La négociation collective véritable commença donc lorsque la puissance de la 
section locale fut accrue grâce au support qu'elle reçut de l'Union internationale 
et à la supervision qu'elle exerçait sur ladite section. 
Cette analyse fait voir que l'élimination des méthodes unilatérales de déter-
mination des salaires et l'institutionalisation de la négociation collective bilatérale 
fut le résultat de concessions des employeurs aux travailleurs une fois que le trans-
fert de pouvoir fut apparu clairement. De plus, il est important de souligner que 
la négociation collective constitue un rapport de forces entre organisations tout 
autant qu'un processus de marchandage, de décisions patronales et d'intervention 
gouvernementale. 
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